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The Arms Trade in Russian–Chinese
Relations: Identity, Domestic Politics, and
Geopolitical Positioning
ROBERT H. DONALDSON
University of Tulsa
JOHN A. DONALDSON
The George Washington University
Why would a declining power help arm a neighboring and once-hostile
rising power? Current international relations literature cannot explain
relationships in which one powerful country contributes directly to its
long-term relative decline in order to make smaller, short-term gains.
This study focuses on one example, the Treaty on Good Neighborly
Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the
People’s Republic of China, signed in Moscow on July 16, 2001.
Presenting evidence that this alliance embodies a relationship that is
based primarily on sales of arms from Russia to China, the authors argue
that this association cannot be explained by current theory. Three
variables appear most important to understanding the arms sales
element of this case: declining relative position discloses the structural
factors behind Russia’s actions; domestic policy explains its willingness to
make what had appeared as rash sacrifices; and identity issues explain
the core motivations and interests of each actor.
In a little-noticed ceremony pushed even further into the background by the events
of September 11 and thereafter, the Treaty on Good Neighborly Friendship and
Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China
was signed in Moscow on July 16, 2001. The treaty was not, according to its
signatories, a traditional ‘‘alliance.’’ China’s president Jiang Zemin and Russia’s
president Vladimir Putin were both at pains to insist that the agreement was not
directed against any third country. Spokesmen for both parties further declared
that the treaty was not about military cooperation. The spokesman for the United
States Department of State agreed: ‘‘It doesn’t have mutual defense in it or
anything like that.’’ Other U.S. officials were reported to have said that the treaty
‘‘falls far short of being an alliance’’ (Perlez, 2001; Tyler, 2001a).
Authors’ note: The authors thank the following people for their assistance in improving and completing this
paper: Susan Sell, Deborah Avant, Mark Teel, Michael Spring, and three anonymous reviewers. The authors alone
are responsible for any remaining flaws in their argument. The original draft of this paper was presented to the
2001 Hong Kong Convention of International Studies, ‘‘Globalization and Its Challenges in the 21st Century,’’ Hong
Kong, PRC, July 26–28, 2001.
r 2003 International Studies Association.
Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.
International Studies Quarterly (2003) 47, 709–732
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/47/4/709/1811164
by Singapore Management University user
on 28 February 2018
Published in International Studies Quarterly, Volume 47, Issue 4, December 2003, Pages 709-732
https://doi.org/10.1046/j.0020-8833.2003.00285.x
Many students of alliance politics, however, would conclude that those concerned
‘‘protest too much.’’ In their influential study of international alliances, Ole Hosti
and his colleagues (Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, 1973:4) defined an alliance as
‘‘a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national
security issues.’’ Stephen Walt’s oft-quoted study (1987:12) relaxed this definition
somewhat, defining alliance as ‘‘a formal or informal arrangement for security
cooperation between two or more sovereign states.’’ The Russian–Chinese Treaty
meets the more stringent test of formality, and several of its provisions (especially
Articles VII, VIII, and IX) refer to military cooperation and to cooperative
responses to threats to the security or territory of the parties. While it is true that
the published treaty does not spell out specific military measures, it does require
that, in situations endangering peace or where aggression is threatened, ‘‘the
agreeing sides will immediately make contact with each other and hold
consultations in order to eliminate the emerging threat’’ (New York Times, July 17,
2001). In their classic study of alliance and war, J. David Singer and Melvin Small
(1968:266) classify this type of alliance as an ‘‘entente’’Fas opposed to a defense
pact or non-aggression pact. Other treaties that are unquestionably security
alliances, such as the 1970 U.S.–Japan Security Treaty (Holsti, 1979: 115), are
similar in specifying consultations as the formal requirement following an attack.
Scholars have generally explained the drawing together of Russia and China in
structural realist or balance-of-threat terms,1 and they have reached a near
consensus that both countries are seeking to balance the power of the United States
(Wilson, 2002:11–12), or at least to draw American attention to their respective
interests. Relatively little attention has been given, however, to a puzzle which this
alliance posesFnamely, why Russia would enter into an alliance with China that is
based primarily on arms sales. For in forging and formalizing this alliance, Russia
has demonstrated its willingness to transfer sophisticated weapons technology to a
powerful neighbor with which it has a long history of conflict.2 It is our purpose
here to explore the conditions under which, contrary to the expectations of
international relations theory, one powerful country would sacrifice its long-term
relative position vis-a`-vis a potentially threatening neighbor in order to make
smaller, short-term gainsFa situation puzzling to both realist and constructivist
theorists of international relations. In doing so, we highlight the relatively ignored
domestic political and ideational factors that affect foreign policy. We conclude by
attempting to place the Sino–Russian treaty in the context of the subsequent U.S.-
led ‘‘war on terrorism.’’
1 See, e.g., Anderson (1997); Blank (1998); Dittmer (2001); Garnett (1998); and Wishnick (2001a). Some
simultaneously draw on domestic politics (e.g., Gill, 1998; Wishnick, 2001a) and occasionally ideational issues (e.g.,
Blank, 1998; Dittmer, 2001).
2 Because the puzzle is why Russia would enter into this kind of agreement, our evidence and analysis will focus
on that country’s point of viewFeven though Jiang Zemin has acknowledged publicly that it was he who first
proposed the treaty to Putin. Suggestions that Jiang sought the treaty in order to shore up his domestic standing run
counter to recent scholarship (Lampton, 2001:28) describing a Chinese foreign policy apparatus that is increasingly
secure, professionalized, pluralized and decentralized. Rather, we agree with Jeanne Wilson (2002:11) that ‘‘China’s
timing in proposing it suggests that geostrategic factors played an important role.’’ However, not at all debatable is
China’s motivation for acquiring sophisticated arms and weapons technology. States seek to acquire arms from
abroad in order to expand their military capabilities beyond what they are able to obtain from local resources.
Sometimes this is done primarily for domestic reasons: to secure support of military elites, to build the state’s
prestige and reputation, to expand the regime’s capability for dealing with domestic unrest or rebellion, and to
acquire critical technologies that allow modernization of domestic arms production. Or the motivation may be
primarily external: to acquire deterrent or defense capability against a perceived threat, including specific
technologies that are not locally available; to add ‘‘muscle’’ to back up a state’s position in negotiations; or to prepare
the armed forces for war, sometimes with the objective of acquiring specific territories or resources. A long-term
objective might be to develop the capability to become an arms exporter, using adaptation of technologies acquired
from its own arms imports (see, e.g., Dittmer, 2001; Wishnick, 2001b).
The Arms Trade in Russian–Chinese Relations710
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/47/4/709/1811164
by Singapore Management University user
on 28 February 2018
Theories of Alliance Behavior
Mainstream political science presents a number of possible explanations of alliance
formation; however, none of its theories are able to explain the arms trade that
forms the basis of Sino–Russian relations. Kenneth Waltz (1979:93, 99) and other
structural realists suggest that powerful structural forces compel weaker powers,
irrespective of their histories and domestic conditions, to join together in
temporary alliances with other weak countries.3 Because they are concerned with
relative gains, arms sales (especially to potentially threatening neighbors) are
puzzling to structural realists. Balance of threat realists like Steven Walt, by contrast,
explain alliance formation generally by focusing on four variables: aggre-
gate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and perception of aggressive
intentions.4 An application of this theory to the Sino-Russian case would focus
on specific interests and decisions of the United StatesFsuch as NATO
enlargement into Eastern Europe, security ties with Japan and Taiwan, and plans
for a missile defense shieldFin order to understand the factors that have driven
these erstwhile adversaries into each other’s arms. Their responses would be seen
as attempts to balance not the power of the United States but the threats inherent in
its policies.
There are alternative theories in the realist arsenal which are less commonly
applied to this case. ‘‘Bandwagon’’ realists, like Randall L. Schweller (1994), argue
that in the face of no imminent threatFand when there are potential benefits for
doing soFstates will ally (or ‘‘bandwagon’’) with the most powerful country, not
with lesser powers. The argument that ‘‘status quo’’ states tend to ally with each
other against ‘‘revisionist states’’ could potentially be applied to the present case.5 A
fourth realist theory, by Steven David (1990), argues that leaders in developing
countries will sometimes ally with hegemonic states. By ‘‘omnibalancing’’ against
domestic threats, David argues, such states buy time to deal with more imminent
domestic threats to regime or personal survival.
The various proponents of constructivism (Adler, 1996; Ruggie, 1998; Wendt,
1999) emphasize the importance of inter-subjective identities and ideas in
understanding international relations. Adler and Barnett’s edited volume on
security communities (1998) illuminates factors, including technology, identity, and
common perceived threats, which instigate and deepen interpersonal under-
standings, sometimes leading to affinity and even lasting alliances. In spite of
contrasting assumptions made by realists and constructivists, some scholars have
attempted a fusion between these two theories. One notable attempt is from Henry
Nau (2002), who combines ‘‘national identity’’ variables with realist assumptions.
Most realists determine the interests that nations pursue by assumption. Nau,
however, focuses on national identity to ascertain the interests that motivate
countries in the global arena.6
We shall return to these theories after very briefly reviewing the development of
the Sino–Russian alliance and more fully exploring its arms sales dimension.
3 As Waltz (1979:127) argues, ‘‘Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the
stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated and safer, provided of
course, that the coalition they join achieves enough defense or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from
attacking.’’
4 It is the subjective perception of the intention that is key to understanding alliance, at least for Walt (1987:25):
‘‘Perceptions of intent are likely to play an especially crucial role in alliance choices.’’
5 A variation on the bandwagoning argument holds that Russia is feigning an approach to China in hopes of
improving its ability to bandwagon with the United States, and thereby attracting additional aid or trade. According
to this viewFsuggested to us by an anonymous reviewerFRussia is ‘‘playing the China card.’’
6 Neoliberal institutionalists, while prominently engaged in challenging realist theories, have traditionally shied
away from security issues, and therefore we do not consider their theories here.
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Arms Trade Between Erstwhile Antagonists
Normalization of the relationship between Moscow and Beijing was neither quick
nor easy. The USSR had signaled its interest in settling its costly conflict with China
as early as 1981, but not until Mikhail Gorbachev came to power did Moscow show
willingness to satisfy the conditions Beijing had laid down for its resolution
(Wishnick, 2001a:parts 1 and 2). Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing in May 1989
symbolized the end of the Cold War between the two Communist giants. Two years
later they announced an agreement on delimitation of 98 percent of their
borderFa deal that was reaffirmed by the successor states to the USSR (by the
Russian Federation in March 1992 and by Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan
in October of that year). Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin held seven summits between
December 1992 and December 1999. The gradual escalation in the rhetoric used to
describe these presidential visitsFfrom a ‘‘constructive partnership’’ to a relation-
ship ‘‘determining the fate of the twenty-first century’’ (Donaldson and Nogee,
2002:276–77)Fserved as a barometer of the changed atmospherics in the Sino–
Russian relationship or, at any rate, of the way in which Moscow and Beijing wanted
the world to view it. A note that grew progressively louder in their communique´s
was opposition to the ‘‘hegemonism’’ and ‘‘unipolarity’’ practiced by an unnamed
power and their mutual dedication to a ‘‘multipolar world.’’
The improved relations between the former adversaries brought an easing of
tensions on their border and a renewal of trade. Although the two states never
managed to conclude an agreement over the last disputed sections of their border,
they did achieve a significant reduction in the military presence on both sides of the
border. Beginning in 1997, discussions of such issues were held in the context of a
new forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, involving the leaders of
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and (eventually) Uzbekistan (the ‘‘Shanghai
Six’’). Despite an ambitious target, set in 1994, of achieving a trade volume of $20
billion by the end of the decade, Sino–Russian trade actually declined as a result of
tightened Russian visa requirementsFimposed in the face of a rising tide of Chinese
immigration (most of it illegal) into the sparsely populated Russian Far East. Indeed,
by the end of Yeltsin’s term as president, trade had stagnated at just over $6 billion a
yearFthe largest component of which was Russian weaponry sold to China.
These arms sales were not unprecedented. Within a Cold War alliance
framework in which both sides allied to balance the power of the U.S., the Soviet
Union had played a major, if short-lived, role in the 1950s in modernizing China’s
military forcesFespecially its air forceFand building its defense industry, while
remaining cautious in holding back its most advanced technologies. During the
lengthy conflict with Moscow, China had largely pursued Mao Zedong’s principle of
‘‘self-reliance.’’ But in the 1980s, as its rate of economic growth began to rise in the
wake of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, China had also ventured out onto the world
arms market to purchase weapons from Western countries eager to support China
against the Soviet Union. However, the Western response to the Chinese regime’s
brutal repression of the democracy movement included an embargo (which proved
short-lived) on new arms sales to China. Since the reopening of China’s political
and economic ties with Gorbachev’s USSR occurred at this very time, it appeared
that if China were to pursue its goal of advancing its military modernization, the
USSR again was the only logical source of supply. As noted by Bates Gill and Taeho
Kim (1995:72):
[W]ithin only days of the Tian’an’men crackdown, the Chinese leadership made
approaches to Moscow for access to technologies and financial support to replace
those expected to be lost from the West. The collapse of the Soviet Union also
removed the principal strategic motivation behind Western, and especially U.S.,
transfers of weapons and technologies to China, so that China had to turn
elsewhere.
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At the very moment that the end of the Cold War brought a dramatic drop in the
world demand for arms, China’s military was appearing on the market, its pockets
fuller than ever before. Indeed, during the dramatic period of economic expansion
in China in the 1990s, the resources available to the Chinese military have increased
by about 75 percent, even though military expenditures as a share of GDP have
steadily declined (SIPRI, 1999:349). But China had not altogether jettisoned the
‘‘self-reliance’’ principle, and it was determined not to again become dependent on
a foreign supplier for its military strength. Accordingly, what China primarily
sought on the market was not ‘‘off-the-shelf ’’ weaponry, but access to the
technology that would allow Chinese industry to produce modern weapons
locally.7 Thus, even when Western suppliers reopened their doors to Chinese
buyers, China continued to make few acquisitions from non-Russian sources (with
the exception of Israel), in part because of unhappy memories of the earlier
experience with Western sanctions, but largely because of the West’s reluctance to
sell technology along with arms (Gill and Kim, 1995:91–96).
The newly forged rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing coincided not
only with China’s renewed appetite for foreign arms but also with a serious
depression in Moscow’s defense industry. The virtual collapse of the Soviet military-
industrial complex, which only accelerated after the breakup of the USSR, resulted
primarily from the drastic cut in the weapons acquisitions budgets of the Soviet/
Russian militaryFitself a result of Gorbachev’s arms control agreements with the
U.S. According to Russian government figures, between 1991 and 1995, 2.5 million
of 6.1 million employees left the defense sector; in 1996, only 10 percent of the
industry’s capability was being utilized. A large part of the orders that were placed by
the Russian military went unpaid; at the beginning of 1998, the government owed
18.5 trillion rubles to defense enterprises (Sergounin and Subbotin, 1999:15–16).
Simultaneously, the world market for arms, on which the USSR had been a major
player, declined drastically, in part because of the negotiated settlement of a
number of regional conflicts in the Third World. By 1991 the market for arms in
the developing countries had dropped to $28.6 billion, down sharply from $61
billion in 1988. It continued to decline in the immediate post-Soviet years, reaching
$15.4 billion in 1995, before rising again in the second half of the decade, to about
$20 billion in 1999 (Shenon, 1996).
Russian defense industry lobbyists argued that the total collapse of their sector
would be disastrous for the country. The impact of the expected loss of jobs would
be especially severe in some regions and localities (especially in Siberia and the Far
East), where defense enterprises were often the sole industry. Defense ministry
officials were alarmed at the prospect that the closing of numerous plants and
design bureaus could terminate research and development of new technologies,
exacerbating the decline of the Russian military. In the view of some military and
industry specialists, this outcome could be averted only by means of a systematic
effort to rebuild the volume of Russian arms exports. Stephen Blank (1998:359)
reports that ‘‘in 1997 defense producers were told that they had to sell conventional
systems until the year 2005 and that supervision would be minimal.’’ Estimates of
the revenues that could be produced ran as high as $30 billion. Figures
approaching this size were, however, utterly unrealistic. A worldwide cut in defense
budgets, combined with a glut of surplus weapons on the market, meant that the
competition for orders of new weapons would be extremely stiff. Moreover, not
only had the peak Russian sales in the 1980s resulted in part from the Iran–Iraq
7 As General Liu Huaqing, at the time China’s most senior active-duty officer, put it in 1993: ‘‘When we stress
self-reliance, we do not mean that we will close the door to pursue our own construction. What we do mean is to
actively create conditions to import advanced technology from abroad and borrow every useful experienceyto
mainly rely on our own strength for regeneration, while selectively importing advanced technology’’ (Gill and Kim,
1995:56).
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war, but the reported actual revenues that past sales had produced were highly
inflated. An estimated 44 percent of reported sales were thought to be fictitious
(Gaddy, 1996:91)Fa result of inflating prices or financing with ‘‘soft’’ credits.
Nevertheless, defense lobbyists apparently succeeded in persuading the ‘‘refor-
mers’’ in Yeltsin’s government that valuable funds needed for conversion of the
defense industry could be obtained from foreign sales (Sergounin and Subbotin,
1999:18–19).
As a result of a determined sales effort, Russia reversed the declineFthough
revenues fell far short of predictions. In 1995 sales totaled 65 percent higher than
in the previous year. Although cash receipts in that year were only about $3 billion,
Russian sources claimed that this was still twice the amount that actually flowed
into state coffers in 1987, when announced sales were almost entirely financed
with ‘‘soft’’ credits. As an indicator of the importance of rebounding arms exports to
the Russian defense economy, exports in 1995 were said (Felgengauer, 1995;
Golotiuk, 1996) to constitute half of the industry’s total revenues. In the closing five
years of the 1990s, according to calculations of the respected Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2000), deliveries of Russian arms
amounted to $14.6 billion, compared to $53.4 billion for the United States in the
same period. China and India together have accounted for about 70 percent of
recent arms sales from Russia (Jane’s, 2001). In spite of the Soviet experience with
‘‘soft’’ credits, however, the Russians have not moved to a strictly ‘‘cash and carry’’
basis for their arms sales. Only about 60 percent of revised 1996 and 1997 revenues
were said (Felgengauer, 1997b; Makienko, 1998) to have been collected in
convertible currencies.
The relatively large amount of revenue brought in to the cash-strapped Russian
economy by arms exports has sparked a scramble for control of arms sales. Until
the practice was ended in 1997, large banks were able to profit from the use of
funds deposited from sales, which sometimes never reached the factories that
manufactured the weapons (Sergounin and Subbotin, 1999:67). In August 1997,
Yeltsin decreed that the chief Russian arms export agency, Rosvooruzhenie, would
be put under the supervisory control of a commission chaired by the prime
minister. In a new division of labor, Rosvooruzhenie was given responsibility to deal
with foreign sales of arms and military equipment, while a new agency (Rossiiskie
Tekhnologii, or Russian Technologies) was established to sell licenses, and another
(Promeksport, or Industrial Exports) to sell obsolete used arms and spare parts.
Defense enterprise representatives complained bitterly about this system. Not only
did it prevent all but a few of the firms from negotiating their own contracts, but it
also reduced their hard currency earnings by allowing a sizable commission to be
taken by the state agency (Sergounin and Subottin, 1999:ch. 3).
Continued reports of corruption and inefficiency prompted Putin to reconso-
lidate arms exports agencies in 2000. The new agency, Rosoboroneksport, was
placed under the direction of Andrei Belianinov, a former KGB official. In the
future, the president and not the prime minister was to chair the supervisory
commission on ‘‘Military Technical Cooperation with Foreign States’’ (the Russian
euphemism for arms sales), although a closer level of scrutiny would be provided by
the Ministry of Defense. Putin’s decree listed certain types of weaponry approved
for export and certain countries eligible to receive them. The Cabinet of Ministers,
formerly heavily involved with arms exports, would in the future be consulted only
when proposed sales were linked to foreign debts or required government
financing.
Most analysts agree that Russia’s commercial motivations have dominated in its
arms sales relationship with China. In this context, Russia all but abandoned the
cautious approach to arms sales it had taken in the 1950s. The first exchange of
military visits in several decades occurred in June 1990, and resumed arms
sales were apparently on the agenda. The following May, Moscow agreed to sell 24
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SU-27s to China.8 Reportedly, only 35 percent of the sales price was to be paid in
hard currency. The rest was to be paid as barter, in the form of foodstuffs and
consumer goods. However, whereas the barter method initially constituted about
three-fourths of Chinese payments, China’s growing dollar trade surpluses have
enabled Russian negotiators to arrange for hard currency payment in recent
contracts (Felgengauer, 1997a).
Combat aircraft have continued to be the chief component of Russian deliveries;
China has now purchased at least six dozen transcontinental SU-27 fighters, which
are capable of making the Beijing-to-Moscow trip in two and one-half hours with
one mid-air refueling. In 1999, China concluded an agreement, valued at more
than $2 billion, for 40 to 60 SU-30sFtwo-seat multipurpose fighters capable (with
certain modifications) of carrying nuclear weapons. Other categories of purchases
which have been concluded or which are being discussed include naval vessels
(Sovremennyi-class destroyers equipped with supersonic missiles, two Kilo-636
diesel-powered submarines,9 and less advanced Varsha-vianka submarines), S-300
surface-to-air missile complexes, T-72 tanks, Smerch multiple rocket launchers, and
the technology for advanced gas centrifuges used in uranium enrichment and for
MIRVed missiles.
From China’s standpoint, however, the most significant purchase break-through
came as a result of the October 1992 visit of Deputy Defense Minister Andrei
Kokoshin, which resulted in an agreement to transfer significant technology and
production rights. In 1995 China agreed to pay about $1.4 billion for the
technology and licenses to manufacture the SU-27 at a factory in Shenyang
province. The Russian press reported concerns that China would thereby free itself
of the need to purchase aircraft from Moscow in the future, and that if China made
minor modifications to the plane’s design, it might even become a competitor in the
export market. (Indeed, by 1999 China had already climbed to fourth place in
global arms sales10). Russian officials were quoted as saying that Russia needed the
contract to save its defense industry, and that profits from the contract would be
plowed back into development of new aircraft technology. But another account
(Bagrov, 1996) claimed that there was no prospect of a new generation of Russian-
made planes in the foreseeable future, and that officials were simply trying to cover
up a major blunder on the part of Russian negotiators, the circumstances of which
were scheduled to be discussed even in a special meeting of the Security Council.
Subsequent reports (Sergounin and Subbotin, 1999:67) claimed that part of the
funds from deals such as this were siphoned off by Yeltsin’s senior aides into foreign
bank accounts, some of which were tapped for the president’s 1996 re-election
campaign expenses. Such examples of the domination of weapons sales by private
and political interests, and the surrounding air of corruption, have led one analyst
(Blank, 1997) to describe the result as the ‘‘privatization’’ of Russia’s security policy
in Asia.
Even though the Russians have withheld some of the most advanced technologies
sought by China, there is little doubt that their assistance to the modernization of
China’s armed forces has been a significant positive contribution to their bilateral
relationship. In addition to the SU-27 contract, other forms of technology transfer
are taking place. Large numbers of Russian scientists and engineers with long-term
contracts are working in Chinese design bureaus and defense plants, Chinese
8 The SU-27 ‘‘Flanker’’ air superiority aircraft, comparable to the F-15 in performance, has a long range,
advanced avionics, and a wider array of mission capabilities.
9 ‘‘The Kilo Class submarines would be a significant addition to China’s aging submarine fleet. [It] is diesel-
powered and is designed for both anti-surface and anti-submarine (ASW) roles. With a maximum submerged speed
of 17 knots and cruising range of 9500 km, it has an endurance of 45 days under the surface with a crew of 51’’ (Gill
and Kim, 1995:62).
10 In the 1994–98 period, China’s chief customers (SIPRI, 1999:426) were Thailand, Iran, Myanmar, and
Pakistan. For the latter three states, Beijing was the only available supplier.
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engineers are training at Russian facilities, and more than 100 joint production
projects have been launched. And yet these contacts are said (Sergounin and
Subbotin, 1999:92) to be carried on within strict limits:
[T]his cooperation should not be overestimated: it is far from being a relationship
of real allies in terms of depth and openness. Despite the seriousness of the
partners, their motives are pragmatic and sometimes selfish. There is no real
cordiality or frankness in their relations. They are cautious and even suspicious of
each other’s intentions and motivesy.Russia does not permit the export of its
most advanced weapons systems and technologies and is not completely satisfied
with the financial conditions of its arms deals with China. China is concerned
about the risk of over-dependence on Russian arms supplies.y Regardless of
their common interests, they will keep some distance between them where
military and security matters are concerned.
Russian arms sales to China are so prominent in their bilateral relationship that
they represent the main link between the countries, one that motivates and forms
the basis of their deepening relationship. As Yury Tsyganov (1999:307–8) noted,
‘‘the emergence of a military and political Sino–Russian alliance seems incon-
ceivable as their geopolitical and strategic national interest do not coincidey. At the
same time, both countries are ready to develop military-technical cooperation, one
of the major driving forces for their current ties.’’ The authors of a RAND study of
China’s ‘‘grand strategy’’ (Swaine and Tellis, 2000:119) reach a similar conclusion.
In their opinion, China’s ‘‘relations with Russia are oriented primarily toward
reducing the chances of political and military conflict between the two former
antagonists and acquiring critical military technologies that cannot be obtained
[elsewhere]y. Although this essentially arms procurement relationship has now
been baptized as a ‘strategic partnership,’ it is so only in name.’’
Reassessing Theory
Before assessing the theories introduced in the first section, we briefly underscore
two critical elements of this case that any complete theory must explain. First, a
decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and China established a
relatively weak alliance, with vaguely worded promises of military and economic
cooperation. This agreement, reached after years of a roller-coaster relationship,
occurred in the context of declining hostility between Russia and China, as well as a
steep Russian economic decline, mirrored by China’s rise. Second, the alliance was
established within the context of rapidly increasing sales of Russian arms to China.
These sales of sophisticated weaponry form the central nucleus of the relationship
between the two countries. These deals are coupled with a domestic conflict in
Russia over the control of the arms industry, and a lingering coolness in the contacts
between Russians and Chinese below top leadership levels.
In light of Russia’s decline and the rise of the U.S. to such a level of power as to be
considered a hegemon,11 structural realists argue that Russia and China’s relation-
ship is intended to balance U.S. power. A structural realist framework is used
implicitly by most Western academics and analysts focusing on the subject. Such
scholars point to geopolitical factors such as Russia’s decline, in the wake of the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and the country’s inability to
compete effectively with the United States. The Russians thus sought out China, a
rising power, to balance the hegemonic power of the United States. Structural
realists would also be comfortable with the fact that these two powers were
11 There is consensus among realists that the U.S. should be considered a hegemon; debate has focused (e.g.,
Wohlforth, 1999; Layne, 1993) on how long U.S. hegemony will last in the post–Cold War period.
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antagonists in the recent past, were friendly before that, and are now warming
again.12
Overall, however, structural realism’s explanation is inconsistent with this case.
First, the military component of the alliance is weak and vaguely worded. Neither
side can reasonably expect the degree of commitment from the other needed to
balance U.S. power.13 Second, because it is driven solely by balance of power
considerations, structural realism offers little assistance in understanding the timing
of the relationship. Why would Russia and China choose to enter into this
relationship now, and not earlier, such as just after the Soviet Union collapsed, as
one might expect if power balances were truly the prime mover of the international
system? Third, this bilateral relationship is marked by intermittent efforts on both
sides to reach out to the United States, even as each worked to resolve mutual
differences with the other. If both countries, in spite of their intentions, balance for
structural reasons against the stronger side, how could we explain the attempts of
both Russia and China to bandwagon from time to time with the United States? As
Schweller points out (1994:75), such bandwagoning behavior is inconsistent with
the expectations of both structural realism and balance of threat realism, both of
which expect balances, not bandwagons.
Finally, structural realists are ambivalent about the extent to which nations
concern themselves with their long-term or short-term geopolitical position relative
to other countries. Do nations favor promotion of short-term gains at the expense
of their long-term interests, or will they rather accept short-term sacrifices in favor
of their long-term interests? Structural realists do not agree on this point, so many
try to have it both ways, making post hoc adjustments in their theory to fit empirical
situations.14 In this case, to explain Russia’s actions, structural realists would be
compelled to argue that simply to balance power in the short run, Russia would be
willing to arm its short-term ally, China (since, to structural realists, all alliances are
temporary). Moreover, it would do so without any immediate military threat to its
survival, and in almost total disregard of its own medium- and long-term interests
and positions vis-a`-vis every other country, as well as its immediate position vis-a`-vis
China. These are heroic assumptions indeed.15
This is especially true given structural realists’ track record of arguing the
oppositeFthat short-term gains should not be pursued at the expense of long-term
position. For example, noted structural realist John Mearsheimer (2001:46)
recently fretted that the United States is eroding its long-term position vis-a`-vis
China by ‘‘cozying up’’ to that country while ignoring China’s gradual rise relative
to itself and other major powers such as Russia. Mearsheimer argued that the
United States should sacrifice the dividendsFsuch as economic benefits and
deterrence of war in the short termFthat continuing ‘‘engagement’’ with China
make possible in order to shore up its position over the long term. If it does not
12 To structural realists, neither history nor domestic considerations deserve a place in analyzing alliances.
13 For a classic discussion of fear of abandonment within alliances see Snyder (1984).
14 For example, in a lecture at George Washington University (Oct. 31, 2002) John Mearsheimer argued that,
while he believes Russia will eventually join an alliance with the U.S., India, and others to balance against China’s
rising power, it now sells arms to China because Chinas power is not yet fully realized. This is inconsistent with his
argument that powers like the U.S. do not and should not sacrifice their long-term interests for short-term gains,
and it is an excellent example of structural realists trying to ‘‘have it both ways.’’ If Mearsheimer concludes that
China is rising and that Russia should beware, why shouldn’t Russia (which realists assume makes decisions based on
full information) reach the same conclusion?
15 As is Mearsheimer’s argument, in the same, that Russia’s arms sales to China are not inconsistent with the
claims of structural realism, because they prop up Russia’s severely depressed economy. But this is at base not truly a
realist position, since structural realists like Mearsheimer are purportedly most concerned about relative power.
Russian arms sales to China will erode Russia’s powerFeven in light of the modest gains to its economyFespecially
if Mearsheimer is correct in arguing that China will emerge as Russia’s main adversary. Russia’s arms sales appear to
violate Mearsheimer’s own precept, described below, that powers should not sacrifice their long-term interests for
short-term gains.
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make sense to Mearsheimer that the United States should sacrifice its long-term
position for short-term gains, it should make even less sense to him for Russia to
seek much more ephemeral short-term gains from arms trading at the expense of
not merely ‘‘engaging’’ but arming a neighboring nation that many fear could
become a regional, if not global threat. We contend, therefore, that structural
realism cannot be used to explain why Russia is sacrificing its long-term position for
so few short-term gains.
Structural realists could respond that, with Russia’s arms industry in a tailspin,
sales to China would shore up its strategic might, dependent as it is upon improving
the competitiveness of its weapons technology, much discredited during the 1991
Gulf War. From this perspective, arms sales would indeed contribute to long-term
security, to the extent that they enabled Russia’s defense industry to invest in
regaining its competitive edge. The problem with this argument, however, is that
the revenue which has derived from Russia’s arms sales has not in fact been
channeled into capital reinvestment projects. As we have demonstrated above,
these funds have been the object of a competitive scramble, and a large chunk of
them have apparently been siphoned off for short-term political purposes. Some
funds have been provided to the state budget (Sergounin and Subbotin, 1999:66–
67). The extent to which short-term economic motivations have prevailed over
security concerns is evident in this conclusion drawn by a respected study
(Wishnick, 2001a: 144) of the issue: ‘‘Chinese purchases have proved so important
to the cash-starved defense industry, especially in the Russian Far East, that officials
representing these sectors have managed to override concerns within the military
regarding the possibility of a long-term threat from a resurgent China.’’
However, it is increasingly apparent that revenues from exports will not in fact be
sufficient to ensure the survival of the industry, and that eventually the hard
decisions about major reductions will have to be made (Anderson, 1997; Anthony,
1998:15). Indeed, the prospects for this mounted in 2001, when the Russian
cabinet approved a reform program that would close more than half of the arms
factories. The reform, by one account (Putilov, 2001: 12), ‘‘should put an end to the
current situation, in which limited defense budget money available is spread thin
among dozens of plants and does not suffice either to reequip the Army or to
develop next-generation military hardware.’’ We will say more below about the
quite substantial reasons for arguing that the provision of arms to a powerful and
distrustful neighbor has indeed increased the threat to Russia’s security.
Balance of threat theory better explains the alliance between Russia and China,
though it too fails to explain the arms sales. According to this theory, nations can be
expected to balance threat, not power, as structural realists suggest. Russia and
China established this alliance hoping to balance a number of common threats they
perceive from the United States and other countries. Russia and China are clearly
worried about the long-term prospect that ‘‘unilateralist’’ Kosovo-style actions
might be taken by the United States against their own territorial interests
(Chechnya, Taiwan, and Tibet come immediately to mind). In the estimate
(Pomfret, 2001) of Lu Nanquan, deputy director of the Russian Studies Center of
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the relationship ‘‘now is the best it has ever
beenyChina and Russia have come this far because of the United States.’’ Second,
both Russia and China are concerned about military threats that the United States
potentially presents to their interests. Both sides opposed modification of the 1972
ABM Treaty, fearing that deployment of missile defenses by the United States might
diminish the potency of their own strategic forces. In the East Asian security
environment, the U.S. could threaten Chinese and Russian interests not only
through unilateral actions but also by encouraging JapanFthe former adversary of
all threeFto enlarge its offensive military capabilities. Even without U.S. sponsor-
ship, a resurgent Japan could pose a threat both to the regional balance and to the
separate vital interests of China and Russia.
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A third source of possible threat that could trigger the ‘‘consultations’’ required
by the new treaty has already arisen in Central Asia, in the form of externally
supported Islamic extremist and separatist movements. These threaten Russia’s
Islamic-majority territories as well as China’s Xinjiang region;16 they also endanger
the newly independent states of Central Asia, four of which have joined with their
larger neighbors as the ‘‘Shanghai Six,’’ pledging that they would work together
against ‘‘terrorism, separatism, and extremism’’ and for restoring stability in the
region (Rosenthal, 2002).17
Fourth, not surprisingly, each state also has its own individual security concerns,
not necessarily shared by its partner to the same degree (Burles, 1999:48). For
Russia, further enlargement of NATO threatens to leave it isolated in the European
security environment. China, as the rising power, is more eager than Russia to see
the U.S. presence in Asia diminished. The threat from the U.S.Fin the form of
Washington’s defense arrangements with TaiwanFis much closer for Beijing than
for Moscow. The military presence of the United States, and the potent weapons it
sells to Taiwan, are constant reminders to China of the limits on its option of using
force to compel reunification. China’s opposition to missile defense is more
sweeping than Russia’s, since Beijing strongly opposes theater missile defenses of
the type that could be used to protect Taiwan. Although the U.S. government
argues that the defensive weapons it sells to Taiwan present no threat to mainland
China, any change in the balance of power in the region that increases the difficulty
of retaking Taiwan by force is inherently threatening to China.
Russia, on the other hand, has proposed theatre missile defense as an alternative
to the Bush proposal. Although Russia declared its opposition to Taiwan
independence in the text of the new treatyFa clause China almost certainly
insisted upon as a condition for its signatureFMoscow would certainly not
welcome hostilities in the Taiwan Strait.18 Finally, with regard to China’s territorial
disputes in the South China Sea, China undoubtedly feels constrained by the
United States–Japan security alliance, whereas Russia has not only declared its lack
of concern about this alignment, but also would probably be alarmed if the U.S.
were to withdraw from the region.
If most of these perceived threats remained unspoken in the announcement by
Russia and China of their new partnership, even more hidden from view was a
threat that each state undoubtedly perceivedFthe potential threat posed to it by the other
state had the two chosen not to align. Their rapprochement in the late 1980s had
enabled the former deadly rivals to demarcate most of their common borderFan
enormous achievement not only for them but also for regional and even global
security. But both recognized that the border conflict could be revived if the overall
relationship were to deteriorate.19 Moreover, each could cause the other enormous
misery if it were to encourage or support separatist movements among volatile
minority populations. Left unbound, each would be free to enter into coalitions that
might threaten the other, such as a Russian alliance with India, a Chinese alliance
with Pakistan or Iran, or a combination of either one with the United States. Given
their history, their proximity, and the range of potential issues between them,
16 While China’s concern about the security and stability of its Western provinces, especially Xinjiang, is in part a
pretext for continued repression, China faces a genuine threat to its security in those areas, and the threat of
domestic terrorism remains high.
17 Anderson (1997:47–59) argues that this region is also a source of potential tension between the two powers.
18 Anderson (1997:63) notes that Russia’s economic interests are also served by the Taiwan issue, since Chinese
tension with Taiwan increases Beijing’s demand for Russian-made weapons.
19 As Stephen Blank (1998:354) has noted, the dispute over the entire border could still be reopened: ‘‘Russian
officials carefully note that China turned down Russia’s request that the border treaties be negotiated in perpetuity
and instead insisted on a renewal clause for 2010. Thus in 1995, analysts in Russia’s Institute of World Economy and
International Relations wrote that the future threat posed by China is the most serious in the hierarchy of national
security threats confronting Russia.’’
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perhaps Russia and China concluded that forming a partnership removed the
deadliest possible threat.
Moreover, balance of threat theory, compared to structural realism, better
explains many of the elements of the alliance. First, concerning the timing of the
alliance, several threats (such as NATO expansion and the NMD issue) have
recently become especially salient (Wishnick, 2001b: 798–800; for a dissenting
opinion see Garnett, 1998:15). Second, Russia and China’s bandwagoning behavior
corresponds fairly well to the degree of threat each has felt from the United States.
Especially when supplemented by bandwagoning theoryFto address conditions
under which nations will bandwagon with, not balance, the hegemonFbalance of
threat theory explains the Russian–Chinese alliance fairly well. However, balance of
threat theory is incapable of explaining the extent of Russia’s arms sales to China. If
Russia perceived the U.S. threat as imminent, it would be justified in arming its ally
to deter that threat. Since the U.S. threat to Russian interests appears more distant,
however, balance of threat theory cannot explain these sales. Moreover, such sales
simultaneously erode a country’s relative position and contribute to threats it faces
from other nations.
Moreover, both theoretical and empirical factors suggest that Russia perceives
China as a more proximate threat. Three of Walt’s key variablesFaggregate power,
offensive power, and especially geographic proximityFeach suggest that Russia
could perceive China as potentially threatening. Moreover, while Russia’s sales to
China are unlikely to enhance the alliance’s ability to balance threats from the U.S.,
they do make a sobering contribution to China’s rise in military prowess. According
to one Western specialist (Blank, 1998:353–54), ‘‘many Russian political figures and
military leaders privately worry about selling China advanced conventional
weapons and technologies at a time when modernization of Russia’s naval and
nuclear forces in the East is all but impossible.’’ Russian military sources have
expressed envy that Beijing is receiving more modern equipment than their own
units possess. An article in the Russian press in June 2001 (Grigoryeva and
Safronov) said: ‘‘many Russian weapons designers and military leaders tell of their
concern with our neighbor’s growing military might. And yet they add that Russia
needs these arms sales more than anyone else.yChina accounts for about 40
percent of Russia’s total arms sales to foreign countries.’’ The source of concern is
that the benefits of this relationship are all too one-sided. China appears to be
gaining the modernization of its navy and air force, while Russia is getting modest
hard currency earnings, at a level far lower than needed to bail out its defense
industry, thereby further postponing difficult but necessary adjustments in its
economy. An apt summary of the apparent disparity in the relationship is provided
by Sherman Garnett (2001:52):
The most important near-term consequence of Sino-Russian partnership is a
negative one: the Russian contribution to Chinese military modernization. For the
foreseeable future, China will have an enduring need for Russian military
technology and systems, while Russia will have a variety of reasons to selly.
Russia’s own economic reasons and the ideological motivations of some in the
Russian foreign policy community create incentives for sales, not restraint. These
salesFand the broad defense and technology cooperation that is linked to
themFcould in time alter regional military balancesyin East and Southeast Asia
or the Taiwan Strait.
The one-sidedness of the arms trade is doubly puzzling because of the potential
threat China represents to Russia.20 The incompatibilities and incongruities
20 China, on the other hand, sees Russia as less of a threat. As Garnett (1998:18) argues, ‘‘Chinese experts on
Russia were nearly unanimous in emphasizing the weakness of Russia and the disappearance of a military threat
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between Russia and China in four major arenas are great enough to cause many on
both sides to perceive the other as potentially threatening, thereby suggesting the
presence of the fourth of Walt’s balance-of-threat variables: perception of
aggressive intentions. The incompatibility of Russia and China begins in the arena
of strategic vision, especially regarding the Asia-Pacific region. Russia, having
already experienced a serious decline in its economic, political, and military
strength, is essentially a status quo power in the region, clinging to territories and
positions it won during the Tsarist and Soviet periods. Moscow seeks to reduce
regional tensions while it concentrates on rebuilding its strength. It seeks to
minimize or eliminate threats and maintain dominant influence within its security
zone, which encompasses not merely the territory of the Russian Federation, but
the entire Commonwealth of Independent States. Both regionally and globally,
Russia opposes ‘‘hegemonism’’ and seeks a multipolar balance, with a special role
for itself as a great power with a mission to bridge European and Asian civilizations.
Although its military strength has declined, Russia seeks to maintain its strategic
deterrent and its technological superiority over all other states in Asia. It seeks to
integrate its economy with those in the Asia-Pacific region, although its major
economic orientation is toward the West.
China, on the other hand, is essentially a revisionist power, seeking to gather the
economic and military capabilities to dominate the region and to compete with the
United States on the global stage (Blank, 1998:356). In order to do so, it needs
continued access to energy resources in Russia and Central Asia, as well as to
Russia’s advanced military technologies. China is determined to gain its territorial
objectives in Taiwan and the South China Sea, while retaining its position in Tibet
and increasing its influence over Mongolia and the states of Central Asia. It seeks to
maintain military superiority over India and Japan, in part through its ties with
Pakistan and Korea, and in part through reducing the U.S. presence in the region.
It seeks to preserve its advantageous economic relationships with the West without
conceding to its demands for altering its internal political and social practices.21
Second, in the economic arena, Russia and China have experienced one of the
most stunning reversals of economic position in recent history.22 Once one of the
most industrially advanced, Russia’s economy has declined to almost half its former
value, with more than one-third of its people living below the officially defined
subsistence level, and it must now contend with the label, ‘‘Upper Volta with
rockets.’’ Once one of the world’s poorest countries, China’s GDP now ranks third
in the world, depending on the way it is measured, and its rate of growth is the
fastest of all major countriesFdestined, in the view of its optimists, to regain its
former glory. Even with its 1.3 billion population continuing to grow, and Russia’s
146 million continuing to decline, China is on course soon to surpass Russia on
a GDP per capita basis.23 Not only are the directions of their economies diverging,
but the lack of complementarity has also caused their trade to stagnate, as noted
above. China seeks to satisfy its demand for advanced industrial equipment not in
Russia, but in the West. Apart from energy and arms, the remaining portion is
localized in border areasFso-called shuttle tradeFand involves foodstuffs and
cheap consumer goods. The management of Russian–Chinese trade is plagued with
from the north for the foreseeable future. These experts were confident that long-term developments would remain
favorable to China.’’
21 This divergence in strategic vision underscores why Schweller’s bandwagoning theory, which expects like-
minded nations to ally together (e.g., revisionist powers with revisionist powers), cannot by itself explain the
Russian–Chinese alliance, much less the arms trade between the two.
22 This reversal might more accurately be called a reversion, given China’s lead over Russia which lasted from
the 14th to the 19th centuries. For a brief and excellent summary see Dittmer (2001).
23 It should be noted, however, that many Western economists (e.g., Brandt and Zhu, 2000:422) doubt that
China has maintained its recent high levels of economic growth.
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contract violations, corruption, disorder, and distrust (Sato, Tian, and Koh, 1999;
Supian and Nosov, 1999).
Third, the demographic arena over the long term is bleaker still, especially for
Russia’s border regions of Siberia and the Far East.24 Although abundant mineral
and energy resources are found in these regions, they are the most economically
and politically troubled. Capital investment in this area had fallen by 1995 to 18
percent of 1990 levels. Along with capital, the region’s labor resources were also
declining; it lost 9 percent of its population in the 1990s, in spite of a large influx of
foreign immigrants, both legal (primarily Korean) and illegal (primarily Chinese).
As noted above, a policy of open borders was reversed in 1993, when Russia
imposed strict visa requirements, thereby shutting down much of the shuttle trade.
With population density ten times larger on the Chinese side of the border than on
the Russian side, however, it is estimated that there may be 7–10 million Chinese
living in Russia by the middle of the century. Strong resistance by the regional
political authorities, together with acute fears of the ‘‘yellow peril’’ on the part of the
Russian population, have made it especially difficult for Moscow to implement the
immigration and investment programs that will be necessary if this critical region is
to be developed to its full potential. The sobering conclusion of Dmitri Trenin
(1999:36), deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, is that ‘‘Russians must
realize that if they cannot ensure development of the Far East and Siberia, Russia
will lose those territories one way or another and somebody else will then develop
them.’’
In the opinion of Trenin and other informed observers, a fourth arena of
fundamental Russian–Chinese divergence is their mutual distrust and indifference
to one another’s culture. While the summit meetings of the two leaderships have
been marked by ostentatious cordiality, this may well diminish with the coming
generational change in China, which will remove the last of the Russian-speaking
Soviet-educated elite. Their successorsFlike the current Russian political eliteF
came of age politically at a time when the Sino–Soviet conflict was at its height and
contact between the two peoples was at a minimum. At the level of the masses, the
residual effects of years of hostile propaganda will be difficult to surmount.
Especially in the Russian Far East, high levels of criminal activity and corruption
have not contributed to good feelings. As one study, (Miyamoto Wang, and Park,
1999:204) concluded, ‘‘Levels of trust between Chinese and Russians and between
Japanese and Russians hover near the bottom of any scale of measurement.’’
Despite the fact that contacts between the peoples are freer than ever, there is no
significant tourism, and cultural ties are artificially channeled through a Soviet-style
‘‘friendship society.’’ As Trenin (1999:39) summarizes the situation:
Russians do not show any active interest in China, its language, and culture, and
prefer that the Chinese learn their language. The Russians do not quite
understand the image that the Chinese have of Russia. Russian imperialism for
the Chinese is not a propagandistic cliche´ but part of their history. Contacts
between officials, be they government or military, are shallowymany Russians
are terrified at the prospect of a significant Chinese population appearing in
Russia.
Most Russian analysts appear to believe that China’s near-term foreign policy
ambitions are directed toward Taiwan and the South China Sea, and that her
interests in stability in Central Asia parallel those of Russia. Russian-made
equipment may indeed enable Beijing to obtain a regional advantage in force-
projection capability in a future Taiwan crisis; the Sovremennyi destroyer’s cruise
24 See Anderson (1997) and Dittmer (2001:407). According to Wishnick (2001b: 808), resentment over
economic and demographic issues with China spans the Russian political spectrum.
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missiles have a combat range of 300 miles, are reportedly resistant to U.S. air
defense systems, and will allow China to test the naval superiority of the United
States in the East China Sea. China’s growing capability, in support of a doctrine
that is oriented toward local and limited wars on or near its borders and
that emphasizes mobility, lethality, and preemption, is making other regional
powers uneasy, and may stimulate a new arms race in the region. Nevertheless, the
chief policymakers in the Kremlin appear to perceive no real danger to Russia in
such contingencies.
Expressing this viewpoint, former defense minister Pavel Grachev declared
(Donaldson and Nogee, 2002:282) in 1995 that ‘‘China poses no threat to Russian
security now and will not in the near future.’’ Moreover, he asserted that if Russia
did not sell arms to China, some other country would.25 Eighteen months after
Grachev stated that he saw no threat, his successor included China on a list of
potential enemies of Russia. He was hastily corrected by Evgenii Primakov’s foreign
ministry, which was then eagerly pushing the notion of a Russia-China-India
‘‘triangle’’ to balance U.S. ‘‘hegemony.’’26 Over the next few years such thinking
‘‘marginalized voices in Moscow pointing to a potential threat from China’’
(Wishnick, 2001a: 151).
But Defense Minister Igor Rodionov seemed to be voicing what many Russians
were thinking. This dissenting view, taking note of the demographic imbalance
between Russia and China in the Far East, sees a long-range potential for conflict
between the two continental powers. From the perspective of these observers, even
with respect to the nearer term, by closely associating with China and by selling it
arms, Russia risks upsetting the delicate military balance in Asia and even being
drawn into China’s territorial disputes with Taiwan, Vietnam, Japan, and ultimately
the United States. As one Western specialist (Garnett, 2001:53) summarized:
‘‘Russia’s short-term advantages from arms sales and defense cooperation may well
not be compatible with long-term Asian stability and Russia’s role there.’’
For these reasons, balance of threat, even as it improves upon structural realism,
leaves many gaps in our understanding of this case. Other theories do less well.
Schweller’s bandwagoning theory can explain very little. His argument casts light on
a minor element of the case (why both states at various points have attempted to
improve their relations with the United States), but does not begin to explain why
the alliance between Russia and China was established in the first place. Moreover,
his theory assumes that bandwagoning will occur in times of low threat, a condition
not enjoyed by either country. Finally, bandwagon theorists expect that like powers
ally with each other (e.g., revisionist with revisionist, status quo with status quo),
but, as we have seen, in this situation the opposite appears to be the case. The
theory also has nothing to contribute on the arms sales issue.
David’s ‘‘omnibalancing’’ theory (1990:236) misses the mark primarily because it
‘‘rests on the assumptions that leaders are weak and illegitimate and that the stakes
for domestic politics are very high.’’ While Russia faces a degree of instability and
even violent conflict within its borders, its regime is neither as fragile nor as
illegitimate as David’s theory assumes. His theory applies to ex-colonial countries
ruled by rapacious, self-centered dictators who act in coordination with other Third
World countries. Although none of this applies in this case, we find attractive
David’s core argument that domestic threats can cause states to act in the
25 Although he does not identify the source, Dittmer (2001:409), in the course of his research, seems to have
heard this argument, which he then proceeds to generalize: ‘‘In interviews, the Russians dismiss Western concerns
that their weapons sales might upset the military balance, pointing out that if they do not sell arms to the PRC, some
other country will, with the worst conceivable consequences for Russian security.’’ This notion, of course, runs
counter to the opinion (e.g., Blank, 1998; Gill and Kim, 1995) that China is limited in its sources of arms.
26 The notion of such a triangleFwhich seemingly minimizes the seriousness of the Sino-Indian rivalryFwas
‘‘promptly disavowed by both India and China’’ even though it ‘‘resonated with some segments of the Chinese
leadership’’ (Wilson, 2002:11).
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international arena in ways that seem to undermine their national interests. We
apply this argument below.
Constructivism, too, explains little by itself. The two nations share few norms, they
do not have a long history of friendship, and they lack even basic affinity on either
the elite or mass level. The atmosphere of mistrust which persists would not allow
constructivists to expect bilateral arms trade of such dimensions. Society-level
contact through trade and immigration seems to worsen the situation, contrary to
the expectations of some constructivists. As Evgeniy Bazhanov (1998:84) describes
the Sino–Russian case, ‘‘Human contacts in general create constant friction.’’ The
identity issues of constructivism, moreover, lead to inconsistent expectations in this
case. Russia identifies itself variously as a European power (Wishnick, 2001b: 802)
and as a bridge between Europe and Asia (Dittmer, 2001:410). Therefore, we can
reasonably expect that Russia could turn in either direction. In any case, neither the
alliance nor the arms sales can be based on cultural affinity or common norms.
Nevertheless, as we argue in the next section, a number of ideational and identity
issues are important for understanding this case. We now introduce a new
approach, consisting of three variables that explain our central puzzle.
A New Approach
None of the theories we have examined can explain fully why these two countries
entered into a military alliance based on the arms trade when doing so would harm
one participant’s geopolitical position. The relationship between the two countries,
based as it is on trade in arms, represents a paradox that mainstream political
science theory of all stripes cannot adequately explain. Apparently, under some
conditions, major powers sacrifice their long-term position for short-term gains, a
phenomenon we cannot understand through traditional theories of international
relations. In this section, we will focus on three variables that undergird the
conditions under which nations would make such a choice.
We develop this set of hypotheses cautiously, based as it is on one case. There are
some other cases in which our hypotheses should apply, although that will have to
be resolved empirically. Possible cases not involving Russia include Israel’s sale of
arms to China, which then sells arms to Israel’s enemies. In an earlier era, the U.S.
sold scrap metal to Japan prior to World War II, despite obvious implications
adversely affecting U.S. security.
The most direct parallel of a sacrifice of long-term security interests for short-
term economic gains is raised by Russia’s announced intention to resume the sale of
arms to Iran. In the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement Russia had bowed to
U.S. pressure to halt new sales of arms to Iran. In return for this sacrifice,
Washington had agreed to provide opportunities for Russia to earn hard currency
by launching Western space missions from its facilities. But this infusion of earnings
did not ease the pain felt by the defense industry at the loss of an estimated $4
billion in earnings from sales to Iran. According to a well-informed Russian
journalist (Felgengauer, 2000), the Russian defense industry spent the years since
1995 ‘‘pressuring the Kremlin in every conceivable way to cancel’’ the Gore-
Chernomyrdin agreement, pleading that tens of thousands of jobs were at stake.
When the existence of the agreement leaked in the American press during the
2000 U.S. presidential election, the Russian government seized on the breach of
confidentiality to unilaterally withdraw from the deal. Concerns were expressed in
the Russian press that the country’s hasty reentry into the Iranian arms market
could lead to an escalation of tensions in the Middle East as well as a breach in
Russia’s relationship with the United States. There is no doubt that the prospect
that Iran might hasten its acquisition of nuclear weapons or the missiles to deliver
them because of the Russian exports has been a major concern in the United
StatesFand should be possibly even a greater worry for Moscow, given Iran’s
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proximity and the destabilizing potential of its Islamic fervor. One journalist
(Sychova, 2000) concluded, however, that the management at Rosoboroneksport,
‘‘which is trying to establish its credentials by rapidly bringing in foreign-exchange
earnings, couldn’t care less about international stability.’’ Once again, short-range
domestic benefits seemed to be overriding long-range security interests in the arms
export calculations made by Russia’s decision-makers.27
Variable 1: Declining Power
First, an important element of the explanation is the decline of a major power.
Based in part on the assumptions of structural realism, declining powers are
expected to look to alliances to shore up their position vis-a`-vis more dominant
powers. In this case, the decline of Russia’s position was the major factor behind its
decision to approach China as a potential partner.28 Since structural realism cannot
explain Russia’s sacrifice of long-term position in favor of the short term and its
willingness to ally with a past and potential rival, we need to add two additional
elements to this theory.
Variable 2: Domestic Politics
Foreign policy decisions can be shaped by the contests for influence among groups
and individuals, thus raising to the fore in Yeltsin’s or Putin’s Kremlin, not wholly
unlike Khrushchev’s or Gorbachev’s before, the question of kto kogo (who is
prevailing over whom). While competitive elections are a new part of the Russian
political landscape, within the Kremlin struggles over competing policies and
struggles for power continue to be closely linked. In the case of Russia’s arms sales
to China, there is evidence (Wishnick, 2001b: 814) that politicians at the right and
left of the spectrum have been opposed. The basic foreign policy division in post-
Soviet Russian politics has been among Westernizers, pragmatic nationalists, and
orthodox nationalists (Donaldson and Nogee, 2002:125–33). At times (1992 and
after September 11, 2001) the former view has prevailed and Russia has sought to
join Western institutions, but for most of the 1990s, the pragmatic nationalist
position enunciated by Evgenii PrimakovFcombating U.S. ‘‘hegemony’’ by way of
a combination of Russia with China and othersFhas been dominant. As we noted
above, the politicians who hold this viewpoint have tended to marginalize those who
are more concerned about the long-term threat posed by Chinese power.
A second way in which domestic politics has figured in this case focuses on the
importance of the Russian arms industry, and Moscow’s effort to stave off its
collapse. Generally speaking, the domestic goals for states selling arms are twofold:
first, to benefit the national economy by acquiring profitsFusually in hard
currencyFand supporting employment; and second, to support and strengthen
the state’s defense industry and maintain its long-term viability by achieving
economies of scale, preserving infrastructure, and recouping research and
development costs. Both are critical elements in Russia’s decision to sell arms to
China. Desperate to stave off the collapse of an industry crucial to its economy and
security and to earn urgently needed hard currency, Russia is compelled to ignore
27 Tor Bukkvoll (2002) documents the shifting fortunes of the Russian military-industrial complex in its efforts to
lobby the government to ease restrictions on arms sales to Iran. In this case, as in the Chinese case, not only were the
short-term profit motivations of the defense industry paramount, but also the interests of the Russian military and
those of the defense industry did not naturally coincide.
28 Unlike some structural realists, however, we do not argue or assume that the decline of a major power sparks a
hegemonic war. Such an expectation is not inherent in the assumption that major powers seek, for structural
reasons, to maintain or improve their positions. (For detailed discussion see Gilpin, 1981; Kegley, 1993; Lebow,
1994; Koslowski and Kratochwil, 1994; Wohlforth, 1994/95.)
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even its short-term relative position, and ally withFand even armFa powerful and
potentially threatening neighbor.
Contemporary international relations theoryFassuming that economic motiva-
tions are subordinated to national securityFis blind to situations when domestic
economic crises can trump national security interests. Most international relations
theorists who focus on domestic politics willingly concede this point, and focus on
the effect domestic politics has on international political economy.29 Though Waltz
himself argues that economics is always linked to the security position of all nations,
traditionally economic concerns have taken a back seat to national security. When
compelled to choose, most theorists agree, nations will sacrifice the former in favor
of the latter. Often, as in this case, the two are inseparably linked.
The task at hand then is to identify the conditions under which an economic crisis
is so pressing that its solution becomes one of the most urgent national security
issues. For this, we borrow from the core idea behind David’s theory of
‘‘omnibalancing.’’ According to David (1990:235–36), Third World leaders,
compelled by domestic crises, ‘‘will appeaseFthat is, align withFsecondary
adversaries so that they can focus their resources on y more immediate and
dangerous domestic threats.’’ The idea that countries will under certain situations
address extremely urgent domestic crises even at the expense of their international
positions resonates throughout this case. Russia’s economic crisis necessitated
sacrificing the nation’s long-term balance with China, which represents a tertiary
threat compared with the economic crisis and the threat from the United States.
Russia sold arms to China in order to buy time and secure resources needed to
ameliorate its most urgent issue, stabilizing its economy and domestic arms
industry. As noted above, David’s theory, by itself, cannot explain any element of
this case. However, for our purposes, we merely need to borrow the idea that states
in decline facing urgent domestic crises will ‘‘balance’’ against their most urgent
threats; in cases such as this, those threats are domestic, not foreign. However,
besides the material interest in addressing its economic crisis, Russia (together with
the other key actors in this case) is also motivated by more fundamental issues of
identity that constitute each country’s interests.
Thirdly, we emphasize the importance of domestic non-state actors. We have
already described the ways in which the Russian arms industry has taken initiatives
on its ownFbeyond the control of the defense ministryFto find markets for
weapons systems, pursuing its own interests even when these conflict with national
interests (Wishnick, 2001a:188). Toward the end of the Yeltsin presidency, the
Russian central government appeared to lose some of its ability to control
particularistic interests, resulting in the spread of critical technologies to states that
might threaten Russia in the future (Anderson, 1997:70; Garnett, 1998:14, 25–27).
Variable 3: Identity
Finally, we borrow from constructivism to understand the core motivations and
interests of Russia, China, the United States, and even Europe, which explain their
actions in this case. To analyze these interests, we relax realism’s rationalist
assumptions and analyze each country’s norms and motivations. Henry Nau (2002)
usefully merges realist assumptions with constructivism’s concern for identity and
norms by focusing on ‘‘national identity,’’ or the domestic values that form a core
consensus that defines norms for legitimate use of force against other societies.
These rules form a core identity that defines a nation’s actions on the international
29 Domestic politics remains one of the most under-theorized causal variables in international relations. Most
international relations theorists who focus on domestic politics as an independent variable (Downs and Rocke, 1995;
Milner, 1997; Goldstein and Martin, 2000) focus on political economy. Very few besides David focus on international
responses to domestic crises.
The Arms Trade in Russian–Chinese Relations726
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/47/4/709/1811164
by Singapore Management University user
on 28 February 2018
stage. By focusing on such issues, we can understand, not through assumption but
through knowledge of nations themselves, the core interests and motivations of
each country, as each sees them.
Russia’s status and identity as a superpower remain important to its conception of
its self-importance and role in the international arena. For a significant segment of
the foreign policy and security elite in Russia, fear of U.S. domination is mixed with
wounded pride and resentment, which is evident despite Putin’s insistence
(Wishnick, 2001b: 806) that, ‘‘Russia is strong enough to respond on its own to
any changes in the sphere of strategic stability.’’ The ineffectiveness of the Kozyrev-
Gaidar ‘‘bandwagoning’’ strategy of 1992–93 deepened this sense of humiliation
and betrayal, while demonstrating the theorists’ proposition that some states are
simply too weak to profit from efforts to bandwagon with stronger ones. As the
declining powerFand so recently a superpowerFRussia now endeavors to
demonstrate that it is still a great power whose interests must not be ignored. In
East Asia, it seeks to forestall a situation in which it simply becomes irrelevant to the
solution of such security issues as the Korean conflict. In its relations with Japan,
Russia may hope to leverage its treaty with China to provide Tokyo with additional
incentive to compromise on their territorial dispute.
China’s sense of identity is also important here. It stresses the importance of
Taiwan as an integral part of China and places the return of the island to Chinese
sovereignty as Beijing’s most important foreign policy goal. Although the U.S. does
not present a direct threat to the Chinese mainland, a China that defines itself in
this way does see a threat in U.S. actionsFincluding its proposed missile
shieldFthat seemed designed to place Taiwan permanently beyond China’s reach.
China’s identity as Asia’s most important and powerful country clashes with the
goals and interests of the United States.
On the other hand, the United States’ sense of identity as ‘‘global policeman’’
promotes its activism and engagement in the region, bringing U.S. policy apparatus
too close for the comfort of both Russia and China. The Clinton administration’s
involvement and even intervention to stop human rights violations and ethnic
conflict in other areas also raises concerns for both countries.30 Both are nervous
about prospects that the Bush administration’s sense of America’s identity as global
enforcer in its battle against terrorism might lead it to establish permanent military
bases in or near AfghanistanFand perilously close to their own borders. To
the extent that the European Union and NATO project a sense of identity
of Europe that appears to permanently exclude Russia, this also expands
Russia’s sense of threat. Constructivism raises these issues of identity and meaning,
and they are clearly important for understanding the genesis and underlying
structure of the problem. Moreover, these issues are not of derivative value; rather,
they form the basis not merely of preference but also of the very actions that each
actor deems appropriate.
In sum, we identify three variables (relative decline, domestic politics, and
identity issues) that appear most important to understanding the arms sales
element of this case. Declining relative position discloses the structural factors
behind Russia’s actions; domestic politics explains its willingness to make what had
appeared as rash sacrifices; and identity issues explain the core motivations and
interests each actor pursues. This framework may be useful in studying the
relatively narrow range of cases in which a declining power faces domestic crises
that potentially require the sacrifice of its long-term relative position. Further work
will need to be conducted on a wider range of cases before we can confidently assert
the importance of these variables.
30 Most Western human rights organizations argue that the Clinton administration’s involvement was
insufficient, especially in places such as Rwanda and Bosnia. Nevertheless, important political and military leaders
in both Russia and China perceive the U.S. in this way.
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The Russian–Chinese Alliance After September 11: How Much Has Changed?
In the wake of the September 11 attacks on the United States, there were clearly
major changes in the orientation of American foreign policy. President George W.
Bush declared that the ‘‘war on terrorism’’ would be the ‘‘singular focus’’ of his
administration’s foreign policy, and that all states would need to choose whether
they were ‘‘for us or for the terrorists’’ in this struggle. Vladimir Putin was
reportedly among the first foreign leaders to sign on to the coalition against
terrorism. China also declared its enlistment in the cause. Both states clearly saw the
American-led effort against al Qaeda as a means of dealing with perceived Islamic
extremist threats to their own security.
In Russia’s case, Putin offered to share intelligence on Afghanistan and al Qaeda
and he raised no objection to overflights by American forces or their use of bases in
former Soviet states of Central Asia in the military campaign against the Taliban.
Simultaneously, he softened his stance on NATO enlargement and his objections to
U.S. national missile defense, and he announced his intention to close Russian
facilities in Cuba and Vietnam. China was less quick and less visible in its reaction
and had less to contribute to the military action in Afghanistan, but it was no less
forthright in condemning terrorist activities.
Some commentators hailed Putin’s new stance as evidence that ‘‘the Cold War
was finally over’’ and that Russia had at long last decided to ‘‘join the West’’; the
American Secretary of State declared (Tyler, 2001b) that ‘‘seismic changes of an
historic scale’’ had occurred in U.S.–Russian relations. For our purposes, the
essential questions are these: in the face of the terrorist threats, has the threat
perceived by Russia and China from the United States faded into insignificance,
and have these two states now chosen a strategy of bandwagoning with the United
States? If so, is there now even less foundation for a Russian–Chinese alliance?
In the Russian case, it is possible that Putin has not cast his lot definitively with the
West, but rather is keeping his options open (Legvold, 2001). Typically cautious,
Putin appears to be anxious not to leap too far in front of his countrymen’s
opinions, and he probably left his November summit with President Bush awaiting
signs that Washington would reciprocate Russia’s moves with positive steps of its
own. Items on Moscow’s ‘‘wish list’’ probably included a desire for U.S. assistance
with Russia’s debts and with her bid for membership in the World Trade
Organization. The Russians also appeared to seek a genuine modification of
NATO’s relationship with Russia, incorporating Moscow’s views more fully into
deliberations on European security, as well as an agreement on a ‘‘strategic bargain’’
that would trade Russia’s willingness to wink at U.S. missile defense tests (under the
continuing umbrella of the ABM Treaty) for deep cuts in the two sides’ offensive
nuclear arsenals. Such a ‘‘grand bargain’’ would indeed have altered the Russian
balance of threat strategy, with its insistence on multipolarity, and in the process
would have vitiated the developing process of balancing with China against
American ‘‘unilateralism.’’
There is evidence that military and security elites, including some in high ranks
in the Kremlin, still suspicious of America’s long-term intentions in the Central
Asian region, were opposed to Putin’s cooperative stance. Public opinion surveys
indicated that the public too was generally skeptical (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet
Press, 2001a, 2001b; Wines, 2001). In the face of this skepticism, Putin conducted a
meeting with parliamentary deputies after the November summit in which he
discussed his expectations that reciprocity would be forthcoming from Washington.
In this meeting, he appeared less cautious than usual, risking the assessment that
Russian–U.S. relations had undergone a ‘‘qualitative change.’’ He was quoted
(Golygin, 2001) as having told his audience that ‘‘anyone who sees our cooperation
as a tactical move prompted by recent events in the world is deeply mistaken. We
are talking about a program of long-term partnership.’’
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The initial American response to Putin’s gambit could not have been
encouraging to the Russian leader. The fine print on the Western offer for
expanded Russian participation in NATO strictly limited the sphere of issues to be
covered and gave the Russians no veto over military actions. Moreover, NATO has
announced its intention to enlarge the alliance to the Baltic area of the former
Soviet Union. President Bush backed away from the rumored agreement that
would have preserved the ABM Treaty, while allowing it to serve as a fig leaf
covering further testing of a missile defense system. Although Putin chose to
characterize this decision as a ‘‘mistake’’ rather than a threat to Russian security, it
was clear that the Kremlin was disturbed. Although a treaty limiting offensive
systems was negotiated, Moscow was displeased with Washington’s statement that
much of the announced reduction in its offensive strategic arsenal would be
accomplished by storing rather than destroying decommissioned warheads.
Moreover, despite the success of the U.S. campaign to dislodge the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan, it appeared that the American military presence in Central
Asia might endure longer than the Russians had anticipated, and this prospect
undoubtedly raised new suspicions about Washington’s continuing efforts to gain a
competitive advantage over Moscow in the production and transportation of the
region’s rich petroleum resources. But the biggest obstacle to Russia’s continuing
cooperation with the United States appeared to lie in their emerging disagreement
(Friedman, 2001) over where the next U.S. move against global terrorism should
come, as evidence mounted that Washington was seriously considering extending
the military conflict to IraqFone of Russia’s long-time partners. Likewise, U.S.
military actions against North Korea or IranFthe other members of President
Bush’s ‘‘axis of evil’’Fwould certainly be opposed by Moscow.
Veteran press commentator Stanislav Kondrashov (2001:6) probably best
summed up the sentiments of Russian foreign policy analysts who were warning
Putin that if he clambered aboard the American bandwagon, thereby abandoning
the balancing strategy that had characterized Russia’s foreign policy in recent years,
he risked abandoning both Russia’s allies and its interests:
It is extremely important to be on good terms with America, but we should not lie
down and let it walk all over us, even for the sake of fighting international
terrorism. It would be more natural for us to make overtures to Europe and form
a bloc with it when America’s pretensions to world hegemony become too
absolute. We must not forget China and India either.
As far as China is concerned, Kondrashov is probably correct in suggesting that it
may have felt ‘‘forgotten’’ by Russia in the wake of the September 11 attacks. While
China expressed its sympathy with the American people and refrained from
attempts to block U.S. military responses to the terrorist attacks, its most visible
diplomatic effort was to heighten anti-terrorist activity in the Shanghai Cooperation
OrganizationFseen in some quarters (Rosenthal, 2002) as possibly ‘‘a counter-
weight to growing American influence’’ in Central Asia.31 Beijing could not have
welcomed Putin’s renewed interest in cooperation with NATO or his willingness not
to raise a fuss about American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Nor could it have
been pleased with Putin’s evident interest in coordinating his policies with Bush’s.
Indeed, we find no evidence thatFonly months after having signed a treaty of
alliance with China that pledged close consultations in the face of emerging
threatsFthere was any high-level effort by the Russians to coordinate policies with
those of their new ally. Once again, the evidence seems to bolster our conclusion
about the weakness of the Russian–Chinese alliance.
31 China, like other nations, has used the war on terror in part as a pretext to deal with a number of domestic
difficulties.
ROBERT H. DONALDSON AND JOHNA. DONALDSON 729
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/isq/article-abstract/47/4/709/1811164
by Singapore Management University user
on 28 February 2018
However, there is one external factor that could yet transform a weak alliance
into a stronger one. If the United States dashes Putin’s expectations and denies
Russia the anticipated benefits of bandwagoning, Moscow could still return to a
balance of threat strategy. Specifically, if Washington chooses to pursue as the next
targets of the ‘‘war on terrorism’’ states such as Iran and North Korea, in which
Moscow and Beijing have long-standing interests, and if it chooses to turn aside
Russia’s and China’s efforts to negotiate less threatening arrangements for missile
defense, for the role of NATO in European security, and for the sale of arms to
TaiwanFin short, if it persists in its stated determination to pursue its interests in
these areas unilaterally, if need beFthen the threat that Russia and China perceive
in the posture of the United States can become ominous enough to create strength
in an alliance that currently lacks it.
The mutual determination of Russia and China to counter this American threat
would replace arms sales as the foundation of the relationship, as balance of threat
theory would expect. Constructivism would agree: a common and imminent
perceived threat can suffice to begin the process by which two countries identify
with one another. Therefore the United States would potentially be creating not just
allies, but friends. Either way, an increasing sense of threat from the United States is
likely to strengthen this now relatively unsteady basis for alliance.
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